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Abstract
Advancements in information technology is known for enabling new business models and new
market mechanisms. Online crowdfunding is one such new mechanism through which entrepreneurs
can advertise their potential products and attract investors from the mass. In this study, we advance
the existing theory on online crowdfunding markets by recognizing that online crowdfunding pro-
vides not only a venue of fundraising to entrepreneurs but also a venue for them to obtain demand in-
formation before production and to signal their intention. We formulate a spatial competition model
between profit-driven entrepreneurs and product-driven entrepreneurs. We find that, while, on aver-
age, profit-driven entrepreneurs earn higher profits than product-driven ones, their advantage is con-
strained by the mechanism of the crowdfunding campaign, and product-driven entrepreneurs earn a
significant fraction of the market. We also discuss model implications on consumer satisfaction and
crowdfunding platform design.
Keywords: Crowdfunding; Entrepreneurs; Spatial Competition; Signaling
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Introduction
Recent revolutionary development of information technology creates a plethora of new opportunities for
entrepreneurs and has fundamentally changed the business ecosystem. The emergence of new business
models, funding avenues and marketing strategies facilitates the rising of heterogeneously motivated
entrepreneurs especially those with conscientious motivations (Steininger (2019)).
One such example is the crowdfunding platform. The business model of crowdfunding, on the one
hand, makes it possible for entrepreneurs to access funds from “the crowd” through websites, social
media and mobile apps etc. On the other hand, it provides a platform for entrepreneurs to tell background
stories that convey their ideas and devotions about their products. This capability enables the thriving of
non-pecuniary entrepreneurs.
A vast literature on entrepreneurship suggests that entrepreneurs have non-pecuniary motivations
and conscientiousness is an essential personal trait to entrepreneurs. (See Kerr, Kerr and Xu (2018) and
references therein.) They value their preference on products and devote to improving the quality of their
ideal products (Rose-Ackerman (1996)). For instance, Elon Musk describes his motivation of being an
entrepreneur: “My motivation for all my companies has been to be involved in something that I thought
would have a significant impact on the world (Marcovici (2014)).” As addressed by the entrepreneurship
literature, entrepreneurs value both profit and other non-pecuniary factors such as their own preferences
on products. But they differ in the extent that they value profits over products.
Online crowdfunding helps heterogeneous entrepreneurs especially those conscientious ones grow a
successful business. For instance, the crowdfunding campaign of PAKT One–a travel bag designed for
the minimalism travelers–on Indiegogo helps the founder build a brand that matched their own taste and
standard of quality (Engle (2017)).
To address this question, we build a spatial competition model where heterogeneously motivated
entrepreneurs compete for a fund in a crowdfunding campaign, while consumers with heterogeneous
preferences on product designs locate on a line. We suppose that entrepreneurs can be conscientious
and have preferences on their ideal products—they care their ideal designs of the product and have
a quality pursue. They vary in how much they value their ideal products over funding or profit, and
thus we call entrepreneurs are of either product-driven or profit-driven type. Entrepreneurs’ types are
private information and drawn from a publicly known distribution. The model allows us to understand
the effect of competition of heterogeneously motivated entrepreneurs on their product choices, and in
turn, consumers and the crowdfunding platform.
Our model has several novel features. The first is about competition, which plays a vital role in the
new ear of the internet. Though entrepreneur’s strategy in crowdfunding campaign and its influence on
the consumer has been studied in the existing literature such as Hu, Li and Shi (2015), Strausz (2017)
and Roma, Gal-Or and Chen (2018), there is hardly any study addresses the role of competition in
crowdfunding platform, and ours fills this gap. Moreover, our paper allows for different motivations of
entrepreneurs including non-pecuniary ones by adopting the concept of product-driven entrepreneurs
in entrepreneurship literature, whereas most spatial competition literature on firms and entrepreneurs
following Hotelling (1929) models entrepreneurs as purely profit-motivated (e.g., Anderson Jr, Parker
and Tan (2013) and Janssen and Teteryatnikova (2016)). Finally, we exploit the properties of spatial
competition model and use players’ location choices as signals of their hidden characteristics. All these
features together paint a holistic picture of heterogeneously motivated entrepreneurs’ interactions in the
crowdfunding market.
Our approach is inspired by two observations of (reward-based) crowdfunding campaign: (i) Funding
matters but not all that matters to (conscientious) entrepreneurs and (ii) Quality is only finalized after the
crowdfunding campaign.1 To capture this richness, we model products determined by both the choice of
design and quality where entrepreneurs can commit to designs through crowdfunding campaign but not
1A key feature of the reward-based crowdfunding campaign is that entrepreneurs can contract with future consumers before
investing in production. Through the campaign, entrepreneurs can contract with consumers on attributes such as designs and
materials but not on intangible attributes such as effort paid to improve product quality.
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the quality, which will be implemented afterward. Thus, entrepreneurs first choose designs as locations,
then consumers make investment decisions, and finally, entrepreneurs deliver products.
In this richer environment, campaign promises play dual roles: as a commitment to product designs
and as signals about how an entrepreneur value the quality of the product. This duality induces a signal-
ing game, and what drives the game is the simple fact that product-driven entrepreneurs care more about
ideal products and, in turn, exert more effort to improve product quality after getting funded. Thus, ce-
teris paribus, consumers prefer to invest in a product-driven entrepreneur rather than a profit-driven one.
The endogenous preference of consumers creates an incentive for entrepreneurs to separate and mimic:
Product-driven entrepreneurs wish to separate from profit-driven entrepreneurs and signal their types to
consumers, whereas profit-driven entrepreneurs seek to mimic product-driven entrepreneurs and hide
their types from consumers. This strategic interaction iterates continuously such that the equilibrium
behavior differs significantly from that when motivations are homogenous.
More specifically, our baseline model focuses on competitive product market, so that the en-
trepreneurs are price-takers. We find that, in equilibrium, heterogenous entrepreneurs tend to choose
(moderately) diversified designs of products. This is in contrast to the predictions in the traditional
markets where price-taking entrepreneurs choose the same products catering towards the median con-
sumer (Tirole (1988)). Moreover, on average, profit-driven entrepreneurs earn higher profits than product-
driven ones but their advantage is limited by the mechanism of the crowdfunding campaign, and product-
driven entrepreneurs earn a significant fraction of the market.
To address the effect of entrepreneurs’ equilibrium behavior on consumers and the crowdfunding
platform, we investigate how consumer satisfaction vary with model primitives such as entrepreneurs’
ideal designs and type distribution in equilibrium and discuss the selection of funding scheme. We eval-
uate consumer satisfaction by aggregating consumers’ preferences and equilibrium decisions and con-
sider the measures of overall quality, design popularity, and consumer welfare. Moreover, we compare
the level of consumer satisfaction under different schemes. Our baseline model implicitly assumes that
the platform adopts the Keep-it-all funding scheme, i.e., entrepreneurs keep the raised fund uncondition-
ally. We further study an alternative funding scheme, All-or-nothing, which allows entrepreneurs to keep
the raised fund only if the funding goal has been reached. We compare whether this alternative funding
scheme improves consumer satisfaction.
Finally, we extend our baseline model allowing for entrepreneurs setting product price. In general,
the insights are consistent with those of the baseline model. The model predicts a moderate diversity of
designs while in traditional markets price-setting entrepreneurs choose the extreme, i.e., totally differ-
entiated, designs. However, the equilibrium computation is complicated and in general, the equilibrium
existence is not guaranteed. So instead, we solve a special case where the crowdfunding market consists
of entrepreneurs of either purely product-driven or profit-driven type. We view this as a theoretical limit
of reality. We further discuss the model implications for platform design in this case. Due to the page
limitation, we do not present the results of the extension in the paper, but will be available upon request.
Related Literature
First, our work relates to the theoretical literature of crowdfunding. Most of the literature emphasizes
a single firm’s problem and study its strategies and associated consequences on consumers and crowd-
funding platforms, while ours addresses the role of competition among entrepreneurs. For instance, Hu,
Li and Shi (2015) studies optimal pricing and product strategy of a single firm facing heterogeneous
consumers. Strausz (2017) addresses how crowdfunding market alleviates moral hazard problem of the
entrepreneur through reduction of demand uncertainty. Roma, Gal-Or and Chen (2018) investigates en-
trepreneur’s optimal strategies of attracting funds from venture capital and/or crowdfunding campaign.
Ellman and Hurkens (2015) assumes away the entrepreneur’s moral hazard problem and characterizes
the optimal reward-based crowdfunding mechanism under that environment. Chemla and Tinn (2018)
discusses a single firm’s crowdfunding strategy in a dynamic setting with the focus on firm’s learning on
consumer demand.
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Second, our study relates to the literature using spatial competition model, which considers spatial
competition among homogeneously motivated entrepreneurs (mostly profit-driven), while ours studies
heterogeneously motivated entrepreneurs including those with conscientious motivations. This literature
stems from Hotelling (1929), arguing that, price-taking entrepreneurs or firms compete on locations and
result in converging to the same location, while price-setting entrepreneurs try to differentiate themselves
as much as possible so as to maximize profit. (See Tirole (1988) for a comprehensive survey.) There are
recent studies using spatial competition model to study online market behaviors. For instance, Ander-
son Jr, Parker and Tan (2013) discusses how spatial competition among video game platforms influence
platforms’ investment strategies and performance. Ho, Ho and Tan (2017) studies the impact of spatial
competition between online cashback platforms on cashback rate of the market and consumers’ choices.
Third, our study relates to the literature discussing non-pecuniary motivations of individuals. A
large entrepreneur literature documents entrepreneurs’ non-pecuniary motivations. (See Kerr, Kerr and
Xu (2018) for a comprehensive survey.) In the meantime, researchers in many fields study the effects of
individuals’ non-pecuniary motivations on their behaviors and associated outcomes (e.g., Akerlof and
Kranton (2005), Benabou and Tirole (2003), Delfgaauw and Dur (2007) and Dixit (2002)). Moreover,
our modeling choice about entrepreneurs’ motivation relates to a political economy literature which
assumes that politicians care both perk and ideology, and the tradeoff between the former and the latter
have an impact on political outcomes. (See Austen-Smith and Banks (2009) and references therein.) We
adopt a similar model setup in the way that entrepreneurs care both profit and product.
Finally, our paper relates to a growing literature about signaling behavior of online market. For
instance, Waldfogel and Chen (2006) finds that firms use online branding strategies as signals of quality.
Roberts (2011) shows small online retailers issue warranties to signal the quality of products. Elfenbein,
Fisman and McManus (2012) studies whether adding charitable donations to eBay auctions can provide
an informative signal about product quality.
Baseline Model
Consider a crowdfunding campaign with two entrepreneurs and a unit mass of consumers. Entrepreneurs
produce the same kind of products but with heterogeneous features. They post their products on a crowd-
funding platform to attract investors. Here, we focus on the competitive product market such as the
market of video games.2 Thus, entrepreneurs on a crowdfunding platform do not have the market power
to set product price, and so take the market price as given.
Entrepreneurs. Entrepreneur e ∈ {A,B} cares funding size, product design and quality. Entrepreneur
e has an ideal design de. The ideal design could be broadly explained. In practice, some crowdfunding
entrepreneurs initially generate their ideas when they are consumers on the market and then launched
a crowdfunding campaign with their favorite design. Besides, entrepreneurs may have a specialty in
producing products with certain designs. Then the ideal design could be viewed as the one incurs the
lowest adjustment (design) cost.
Moreover, each entrepreneur e has a random type te ∈ {0, T} (T > 0), which measures how she
values her ideal product over profit. We call an entrepreneur profit-driven if te = 0 and product-driven
if te = T . The type is private information and the prior probability of te = 0 is λ ∈ [0, 1]. The utility of
the entrepreneurs e is
ue(x, q; de, te) = −te
[
(de − xe)2 + (1− qe)2
]
+ pse(x)− γq2e , (1)
where xe ∈ [−1, 1] is e’s product design, and x = (xA, xB); te is e’s type; se ∈ [0, 1] is e’s share
of fund. The quality of entrepreneur e’s product is represented by qe ∈ [0, 1], and q = (qA, qB). Thus
(1− qe)2 represents entrepreneur e’s disutility from producing low-quality products.
2For instance, most of the video games launched on Kickstarter or Indiegogo are base price around $ 25 to $30. The
commonly adopted price for the traditional video game industry is around $ 30 (Wilde (2017)).
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The marginal development cost of improving product quality is γ, and the cost of delivering qe
quality product is γq2e . The marginal development cost does not vary with the number of products but
does increase with the product quality. In reality, we can think about it as the cost of adopting new
production technology or the cost of improving managerial practice to conduct better quality control.
To simplify the analysis, we assume that the two entrepreneurs’ ideal designs are symmetric. That
is, −dA = dB = d ≥ 0, and henceforth we drop the subscript e. Throughout, we assume xA ≤ 0 ≤ xB
without loss of generality.
Consumers. Consumers care both the design and quality of the product, and each consumer c decides
to invest one unit of investment in EntrepreneurA orB. By slightly abusing notation, we write consumer
c’s ideal design as c, which is uniformly distributed in [−1, 1]. Suppose consumer c invest in the product,
whose realized characteristics are represented by (xˆ, qˆ), then the utility of the consumer is
uc(xˆ, qˆ; c) = −
[
(c− xˆ)2 + (1− qˆ)2]− p.
The timeline of the crowdfunding campaign is as follows.
1. Nature randomly chooses each entrepreneur’s type te, and entrepreneurs observe their types.
2. Each entrepreneur announce her product design x on the crowdfunding platform.
3. Consumers observe the designs and decide whether to invest.
4. Each entrepreneur gets funded and pays the cost γq2e to develop the product; otherwise, they exit
the market.
5. Products are delivered to consumers (investors), and quality q is realized.
The game we have described is essentially a signaling game, which has two senders (entrepreneurs)
and multiple receivers (consumers). The solution concept here is Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium, where
the entrepreneurs and consumers optimize their utilities at every history given the beliefs. Beliefs are
derived by Bayes’ rule whenever possible. For analytical simplicity, we restrict attention to symmetric
equilibria.
Consumer’s Problem Consumers do not observe entrepreneurs’ types and so product quality when
they make purchasing decisions. However, the information carried by the description of the product
design can help them to draw inferences about the type (and in turn the product quality). That is, the
announced design can serve as a signal of product quality.
The consumers’ posterior belief that the entrepreneur e is profit-driven, i.e. te = 0, given observing
design x, is µe(x). Write µ = (µA(xA), µB(xB)). Besides, we assume consumers do not use weakly
dominated strategies, and they only invest for the entrepreneur that maximize their expected utility.
Taking entrepreneurs’ equilibrium design announcement x∗ as given, the expected utility of consumer c
investing in e’s product is
Ete [uc(x∗e; c)|µe(x∗e)] = −
{
(c− x)2 + Ete
[
(1− qˆ)2|µe(x∗e)
]}− p.
Each consumer c forms a posterior belief and makes a binary decision of investing in A or investing
in B by comparing the associated expected utilities. In equilibrium, all consumers’ decision can be
summarized by the market share of entrepreneurB, s(x∗). The market share of entrepreneurA is simply
1− s(x∗).
Entrepreneur’s Problem Entrepreneur e’s strategy can be written as re = (xet, qet)∀t∈{0,T}, and we
denote ret = (xet, qet) for t ∈ {0, T}. Taking all consumers’ strategies, and the opponent entrepreneur
−e’s announced design x∗−e(t−e) as given, entrepreneur e’s strategy ret = (xet, qet) maximizes his
expected utility at each information set:
Et−e
[
ue(xet, x
∗
−e, qet; d, t)
]
= −t [(d− xet)2 + (1− qet)2]+ pEt−e [se(xet, x∗−e)]− γq2et.
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Equilibrium Analysis
We start our equilibrium analysis by analyzing the special case where all entrepreneurs are profit-driven.
Then we turn to characterize equilibria of the baseline model and compare the predictions.
Benchmark: Profit-driven Entrepreneurs
When entrepreneurs are both profit-driven, i.e., λ = 1, our model has the same prediction as in the
literature of spatial competition models: Price-taking entrepreneurs choose the same design–the ideal
design of the median consumer, whereas price-setting entrepreneurs differentiate themselves as much
as possible and choose the most extreme designs. This is because that profit-driven entrepreneurs cater
towards the median when they are price takers, or choose extreme designs to differentiate as much as
possible from the opponent and charge a high price when they are price setters (Tirole (1988)).
Equilibrium Characterization
We now turn to characterize the equilibria of the baseline model. For the rest of the paper, unless speci-
fied, we consider λ ∈ (0, 1), i.e., entrepreneurs are heterogeneously motivated. Since the environment is
symmetric, our analysis will focus on entrepreneur B’s equilibrium strategie, and entrepreneur A plays
a symmetry strategy accordingly.
We solve equilibrium backward and start with backing out the entrepreneur’s choice of quality. Con-
sumers aim to infer entrepreneurs’ types so as to predict quality. Inferring one’s type is confound and
determined through the strategic interactions among players. But predicting product quality given one’s
type is clear and described by following Lemma.
Lemma 1. In equilibrium, the product quality of type t entrepreneur B (if that entrepreneur succeeds
the crowdfunding campaign) is q∗B =
t
t+γ .
The proofs of the paper are put in the appendix, and are available upon request. By Lemma 1, in
any equilibrium, we have q∗0 = 0, and q∗T =
T
T+γ for both entrepreneurs. By slightly abuse notation, we
define q∗ = (q∗0, q∗T ). This lemma implies a simple yet important property of the equilibrium—product
quality is increasing in one’s type. As a consequence, ceteris paribus, consumers prefer products from
entrepreneurs that are product-driven.
Next, we turn to the entrepreneur’s decision on design. We show that in any equilibrium, profit-
driven entrepreneurs choose equilibrium designs weakly closer to the median 0, and earn weakly greater
market share or revenue than the product-driven entrepreneurs. It is because that market size and ideal
design are strategic substitutes for entrepreneurs. Since profit-driven entrepreneurs are less concerned
about the design, they are more willing to compromise on design for profit, which results in a (weakly)
greater expected market share and expected revenue. In the meanwhile, product-driven entrepreneurs
would choose designs that are closer to the ideal ones. Lemma 2 formally states this property.
Lemma 2. In any equilibrium, the following statements hold:
(i) Product-driven entrepreneurs choose product design located weakly closer to their own ideal
design, i.e., |x∗B0 − d| ≥ |x∗BT − d|.
(ii) Profit-driven entrepreneurs earn weakly greater market shares ex-ante. That is,
EtA [s(x∗B0, x∗At)] ≥ EtA [s(x∗BT , x∗At)].
In general, there are many equilibria in our game, since Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium allows for
arbitrary off-equilibrium-path beliefs. To restrict the off-equilibrium-path beliefs in a reasonable way,
we characterize equilibrium under the requirement of Condition D1. The idea is as follows. If type t
entrepreneur benefits more from a deviation than type t′, then after observe the deviation, consumers
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would think that type t′ is less likely to be the deviator, and Condition D1 pushes the logic to the limit,
so that, consumers would assign probability zero to type t′.3
The rest of this section characterizes the equilibrium under Condition D1. By Lemma 1, consumers
prefer product-driven entrepreneurs ceteris paribus due to quality concern, which creates an incentive for
entrepreneurs to separate and mimic: Product-driven entrepreneurs wish to separate from profit-driven
entrepreneurs and signal their types to consumers, whereas profit-driven entrepreneurs seek to mimic
product-driven entrepreneurs and hide their types from consumers.
In the first case, when the entrepreneurs’ ideal design is close to the median design 0, the median
consumer may prefer to buy a high-quality product which locates at entrepreneur’s ideal design rather
than a low-quality product which locates at the median. In this case, a profit-driven entrepreneur would
have an incentive to mimic the product-driven type to hide his type from consumers. Meanwhile, a
product-driven entrepreneur cannot separate the profit-driven type even if she sticks to her own ideal
design. Theorem 1 characterizes the equilibrium for this case.
Theorem 1. There is a unique symmetric pooling equilibrium (−d,−d, q∗; d, d, q∗) if d ∈ [0, d1], where
d1 =
√
(1− λ)[1− (1− q∗T )2]. Moreover, there does not exists a pooling equilibrium if d ∈ [d1, 1].
In the second case, when the ideal design is far from 0, so that median consumer would rather choose
the product with median design and low quality than the product with relatively extreme design and high
quality. Since profit-type cares only about market share, she would no longer mimic the product-driven
type; instead, she would pick the design at the median 0 which gives him the highest market share. In
this case, product-driven entrepreneur separates from the profit-driven by caring for designs. Theorem 2
characterizes this separating equilibrium.
Theorem 2. There exists a symmetric separating equilibrium if and only if d ∈ [d2, 1], where d2 =√
1− (1− q∗T )2. In any separating equilibrium, −x∗A0 = x∗B0 = 0, and −x∗AT = x∗BT ∈ [d2, d). The
equilibrium is unique if T < λd
2
2
4d3
or T > 14d2 . In particular, −x∗AT = x∗BT = d2 if T <
λd22
4d3
and;
−x∗AT = x∗BT > d2 if d > d2 + 1−λ8T .
In the third case, when the ideal design is in between (d1, d2), the median consumer may be indif-
ferent between the product with median design and low quality, and the product with relatively extreme
design and high quality. In this case, product-driven type chooses design at her ideal design, while profit-
driven type is mixing between mimicking the product-driven type and deviating to the median design.
Theorem 3 characterizes this hybrid equilibrium.
Theorem 3. Given λ ∈ (0, 1), then for any d ∈ (d1, d2), there exists a unique hybrid equilib-
rium: product-driven entrepreneurs choose their ideal design and profit-driven entrepreneurs mix over
their ideal design and the ideal design of the median consumers, 0. In particular, profit-motivated en-
trepreneur B choose design 0 with probability σ∗ and choose design d with probability 1− σ∗, and
σ∗ =
1
λ
[
1− d
2
1
d2
]
.
Immediately following Theorem 1-3, we can summarize the equilibrium by Corollary 1:
Corollary 1. There exists an equilibrium for all d ∈ [0, 1]. In any equilibrium, where q∗e0 = 0, and
q∗eT =
T
T+γ for all e. Equilibrium designs depend on where entrepreneurs’ ideal designs locate:
i) If d ∈ [0, d1], −x∗At = x∗Bt = d, for all t ∈ {0, T}.
ii) If d ∈ (d1, d2), −x∗AT = x∗BT = d, x∗A0 = x∗B0 = 0 with probability σ∗ and −x∗A0 = x∗B0 = d
with probability 1− σ∗.
iii) If d ∈ [d2, 1], x∗A0 = x∗B0 = 0, and −x∗AT = x∗BT ∈ [d2, d). Moreover, x∗eT for each e is unique if
T <
λd22
4d3
or T > 14d2 . In particular, −x∗AT = x∗BT = d2 if T <
λd22
4d3
and; −x∗AT = x∗BT > d2 if
d > d2 +
1−λ
8T .
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Figure 1: Median Consumer’s Indifference Curve
Figure 1 depicts the median consumer’s indifference curve which goes through the design-quality
pairs of (0, 0), (±d1, q˜t), (±d2, qT ), where q˜t represents equilibrium quality as a random variable that
depends on the prior distribution of t. This means, the median consumer is indifferent among the com-
bination of the median design and low quality, the combination of design d1 and average quality (across
the distribution of entrepreneurs), and the combination of design d2 and high quality.
The reason is twofold. First, in any pooling equilibrium, competition between two symmetric en-
trepreneurs leaves each half of the market. That is, the median consumer is indifferent between investing
in both entrepreneurs, and all the consumers on the right (respectively, left) to the median strictly pre-
fer entrepreneur B (respectively, entrepreneur A). Thus, a profit-driven entrepreneur B who focuses
more on occupying the market would not deviate from the uninformative equilibrium if and only if at
every deviation, she cannot attract the median consumer, or in other words, the median weakly prefers
investing in entrepreneur A. This holds true for all d ∈ [0, d1]. In particular, the median is indifferent
among (0, 0) and (±d1, q˜t). Thus in the pooling equilibrium where the announcements of designs are
±d1 irrespective of entrepreneurs’ types, fixing entrepreneurA’s strategies, the most attractive deviation
of profit-driven entrepreneur B–choosing design at 0–makes the median consumer indifferent between
both entrepreneurs. But as d moves further away from median, the above no longer holds.
Second, in any separating equilibrium, profit-driven entrepreneurs no longer mimic the product-
driven ones exactly because in the equilibrium they can occupy at least half of the market which re-
sults in higher profit than mimicking. This means, in a separating equilibrium, the median consumer
weakly prefers entrepreneur B if she is of profit-driven type. This holds true if d ∈ [d2, 1]. In partic-
ular, the median is indifferent among (0, 0) and (±d2, qT ). Thus, in the separating equilibrium where
the profit-driven type takes action (0, 0), and the product-driven type takes action (±d2, qT ), fixing A’s
strategies, the profit-driven type entrepreneurB’s design at 0 makes the median indifferent between both
entrepreneurs. When d moves further away from the median, the latter may strictly prefer entrepreneur
B if she is of profit-driven type.
Discussion
Design diversification. In the benchmark, competition among homogenous types of entrepreneurs
drives them to the converging designs catering for the median consumer. As crowdfunding campaign
attracts heterogenous types of entrepreneurs, the latter can convey information about their products (in-
cluding privately known quality) through announcements of product designs. Accordingly, consumers
make inferences from entrepreneurs’ actions, and choose products based on announced designs and
inferred quality. In response to consumers’ demand for high-quality products as well as preferred de-
signs, entrepreneurs are deliberately mimicking or differentiating from others, which results in design
diversification.
3The concept of Condition D1 is originated from Cho and K. (1987).
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Profit of entrepreneurs. Which kinds of entrepreneurs earn higher market shares and/or higher prof-
its? In general, profit-driven entrepreneurs focus more on attracting consumers rather than sticking
to their own ideal designs and improving quality, thus on average, profit-driven entrepreneurs obtain
(weakly) larger customer base. As consumers become sophisticated on forming beliefs about the pref-
erences of varying kinds of entrepreneurs, product-driven entrepreneurs attract half of the market share
when information is not revealed, i.e., d < d1. Otherwise, they earn a smaller size of the market than the
profit-driven ones.
Meanwhile, profit-driven entrepreneurs are less willing to pay effort to improve product quality.
Indeed, in equilibrium, they produce low-quality products and incur less cost in production. As a conse-
quence, they earn higher profits than those product-driven entrepreneurs.
Information revelation. Our equilibrium predictions suggest that design announcements become
more informative about product quality as ideal designs move further away from the median consumer:
Information revealing happens when d ≥ d2, and uninformative equilibrium occurs when d ≤ d1.
Moreover, information asymmetry of product quality between entrepreneurs and consumers is miti-
gated when there are less product-driven entrepreneurs in the population, product-driven entrepreneurs
weigh less on profit, and/or the costs of improving quality reduce.
On the one hand, when entrepreneurs’ ideal designs are further away from the median, d ∈ [d2, 1],
information about product quality can be revealed through the announcement of designs. In particular,
d2 is decreasing in T and increasing in γ. Hence, as product-driven entrepreneurs weigh less on profit,
and/or the cost of improving product quality reduces, d2 decreases and, in turn, more ideal designs would
induce information revealing equilibrium.
On the other hand, when entrepreneurs’ ideal designs are closer to median, d ∈ [0, d1], the an-
nounced designs are uninformative about quality. In particular, d1 is decreasing in λ and T while in-
creasing in γ. As the fraction of product-driven entrepreneurs in the population decreases, product-driven
entrepreneurs weigh more on profit, and/or the cost of improving product quality reduces, d2 decreases,
and, in turn, more ideal designs would induce uninformative equilibrium.
Implication for Crowdfunding Platform Design
This section discusses the implications for platform design from two aspects: (i) How can we improve
the level of consumer satisfaction from the platform’s perspective? (ii) How does consumers’ feedback
vary across different funding schemes?
Consumer satisfaction.
Obtaining satisfactory feedback from existing customers is vital for the functionality of a crowdfunding
platform, including creating and maintaining the customer base, attracting investors for the platform, etc.
We discuss consumer satisfaction from the aspects of quality concern, design popularity, and consumer
welfare.
Overall quality. The quality of a product is private information of the entrepreneur when she an-
nounces the product on the crowdfunding platform. Thus, the feedback about the overall product quality
of the platform is critical for attracting future customers. In particular, we define the overall product
quality of the platform by the average quality of all funded products:
Q =
1
2
E
[∫ cˆ
−1
qtdc+
∫ 1
cˆ
qtdc
]
,
where cˆ is the consumer who is indifferent between investing in either entrepreneur.4
4In equilibrium, any consumer c ∈ [−1, cˆ] invests in entrepreneur A, while any consumer c ∈ [cˆ, 1] invests in entrepreneur
B.
Twenty-Third Pacific Asia Conference on Information Systems, China 2019
Product-driven Entrepreneurs and Crowdfunding
We analyze average quality under pooling equilibrium when d ∈ [0, d1], separating equilibrium
when d ∈ [d2, 1], and hybrid equilibrium when d ∈ (d1, d2) respectively. In any equilibrium, the overall
quality can be represented by
Q =

(1− λ) TT+γ ≡ Q
p if d ∈ [0, d1],
(1− λ) [(1− λ) + 12λ(1− c∗)] TT+γ ≡ Qs if d ∈ [d2, 1],
σ∗Qs + (1− σ∗)Qp ≡ Qh if d ∈ (d1, d2),
where c∗ = x
∗
T
2 −
1−(1−q∗T )2
2x∗T
. Here we writeQp,Qs andQh for overall quality under pooling equilibrium,
separating equilibrium and hybrid equilibrium respectively.
Who should we include in the crowdfunding platform from the perspective of product quality? Propo-
sition 1 answers the question. First, on average, products appear to be of high quality under pooling
equilibrium, i.e., when d ∈ [0, d1]. Second, overall quality is decreasing in the fraction of profit-driven
entrepreneurs. Moreover, Q is decreasing in marginal development cost.
Proposition 1. The overall quality Q of the platform has the following properties: i) Qp > Qh > Qs;
ii) Q is strictly decreasing in λ. iii) Q is strictly decreasing in γ.
Not surprisingly, to improve overall product quality on the platform, we should include more product-
driven entrepreneurs. Yet interestingly, we want all the entrepreneurs to end up with announcing the same
design so that no information about quality is revealed through the design announcements. Therefore,
to improve overall quality, we would want to include more product-driven entrepreneurs whose ideal
designs are not too far away from the median.
Another effective way of improving product quality is by helping entrepreneurs reduce marginal de-
velopment cost (γ). For instance, the platform can subsidize technology adoption, and provide consultant
service for improving the managerial practice of production.
Design popularity. Whether the designs of the products are popular among various consumers has a
great impact on the platform’s market reputation. Converging designs such as the benchmark in Section
would benefit consumers who prefer median designs most while overlooking those who prefer the ex-
treme. Over diversified designs, on the contrary, would benefit the ones prefer the extreme but overlook
those prefer the median.
Our model predictions suggest that products launched on crowdfunding platforms seem to be more
popular in terms of the design comparing to the traditional markets. In what follows, we discuss factors
that may influence design popularity of the crowdfunding platform. More specifically, we define design
popularity of a platform by aggregating all consumer’ preference on designs across all funded products:
Ux =
1
2
E
[∫ cˆ
−1
−(c− x∗At)2dc+
∫ 1
cˆ
−(c− x∗Bt)2dc
]
.
We analyze design popularity under the pooling equilibrium when d ∈ [0, d1], separating equilibrium
when d ∈ [d2, 1], and the hybrid equilibrium when d ∈ [d1, d2] respectively. In any equilibrium, design
popularity is represented by
Ux =

−13 + d− d2 if d ∈ [0, d1],
(−13 + (1− λ)(x∗T − x∗T 2) + λ(1− λ)(c∗x∗T 2 − c∗2x∗T ) if d ∈ [d2, 1],
−13 + (1− σλ)(d− d2) + σλ(1− λ)c∗∗d(d− c∗∗) if d ∈ (d1, d2),
where c∗∗ = d2 −
1−(1−q∗T )2
2d > 0.
How entrepreneurs’ ideal design affect consumer satisfaction from the perspective of design popular-
ity is not clear. Under pooling equilibrium (i.e., d ∈ [0, d1]), the most popular pair of designs among all
consumers is ±min{d1, 1/2}. At the very least, the platform would not want to include entrepreneurs
whose ideal designs are very close to the median. But beyond that, the result is more subtle.
Proposition 2 discusses how design popularity varies across marginal development cost γ.
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Proposition 2. Ux is nondecreasing in γ, and strictly increasing in γ if d > d1.
Therefore, U sx and U
h
x are both increasing in γ whereas U
p
x is independent of γ. Therefore, reduc-
ing marginal development cost helps improve design popularity when designs are not that close to the
median (d > d1) while it has no effect on design popularity otherwise.
Consumer welfare. Finally, we combine consumer’s preference on quality and design and study con-
sumers’ overall experience measured by consumer welfare. In particular, we define consumer welfare
W by the total utility of all consumers:
W =
1
2
E
[∫ cˆ
−1
uc(x
∗
At, q
∗
At; c)dc+
∫ 1
cˆ
uc(x
∗
Bt, q
∗
Bt; c)dc
]
.
We analyze consumer welfare under the pooling equilibrium when d ∈ [0, d1], the hybrid equilib-
rium when d ∈ [d1, d2], and separating equilibrium when d ∈ [d2, 1] respectively. In any equilibrium,
consumer welfare can be written as
W =

W p if d ∈ [0, d1],
W s if d ∈ [d2, 1],
W h if d ∈ (d1, d2),
where
W p = −1
3
+ d− d2 − λ− (1− λ)(1− q∗T )2 − p,
W s =− λ2
∫ 1
0
(
c2 + 1
)
dc− (1− λ)2
∫ 1
0
[
(c− x∗T )2 + (1− q∗T )2
]
dc
− λ(1− λ)
[∫ c∗
−1
[
(c− 0)2 + 1] dc+ ∫ 1
c∗
[
(c− x∗T )2 + (1− q∗T )2
]
dc
]
− p,
and
W h = (1− σ∗)W p + σ∗
{
−λ2
∫ 1
0
(
c2 + 1
)
dc− (1− λ)2
∫ 1
0
[
(c− x∗T )2 + (1− q∗T )2
]
−λ(1− λ)
[∫ c∗∗
−1
[
(c− 0)2 + 1] dc+ ∫ 1
c∗∗
[
(c− x∗T )2 + (1− q∗T )2
]
dc
]}
− p.
Under pooling equilibrium, W reaches maximum at d = min{d1, 1/2}. This is consistent with the
results of overall quality and design popularity: Fixing d ∈ [0, d1], the overall quality is independent of d,
and design diversity reaches its maximum at d = min{d1, 1/2}. Consumer welfare is increasing in q∗T ,
and thus it is decreasing in γ. This is because, under pooling equilibrium, overall quality is decreasing
in γ whereas design popularity is independent of γ.
Under separating equilibrium, the relationship between consumer welfare and marginal development
cost is more subtle. Reducing marginal development cost increases overall quality, but decreases design
popularity. Thus, how it affects consumer welfare depends on which effect dominates the other.
Under hybrid equilibrium, consistent with the case of design popularity, the relationship between
consumer welfare and entrepreneurs’ ideal designs are not clear. Moreover, since marginal development
cost has opposite effects on overall quality and design, its impact on consumer welfare is more subtle.
The takeaway is twofold. First, if entrepreneurs’ ideal designs are not that far from the median con-
sumer so that d < d1, then it’s the best for the platform to include entrepreneurs with ideal designs close
to 1/2. Meanwhile, adopting strategies that can help entrepreneurs reduce marginal development cost
improves consumer welfare. Second, beyond the above situation, the answer is not clear. In particular,
whether the platform should help entrepreneurs reduce development cost can depend on whether the
platform is more incline to improve overall quality or design popularity.
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Alternative funding scheme.
In the baseline model, we implicitly assume that the crowdfunding platform adopts the Keep-it-all
(henceforth, KIA) funding scheme, i.e., entrepreneurs keep the raised fund unconditionally. In prac-
tice, some crowdfunding platforms such us Indiegogo use this scheme. Meanwhile, other platforms such
as Kickstarter use the scheme of All-or-nothing (henceforth, AON), which allows entrepreneurs to keep
the raised fund only if the funding goal has been reached. This section we consider the All-or-nothing
scheme where the funding goal is p2 . That is, the entrepreneur can keep the fund only if she obtains a
half share of the market. Then we compare how consumer satisfaction varies across different funding
schemes.
Following the same logic of the analysis in Section , we obtain the equilibrium predictions as follows.
Corollary 2. There exists a unique equilibrium for all d ∈ [0, 1]. In any equilibrium, where q∗e0 = 0,
and q∗eT =
T
T+γ for all e. Equilibrium designs depend on where entrepreneurs’ ideal designs locate:
i) If d ∈ [0, d1], −x∗At = x∗Bt = d, for all t.
ii) If d ∈ (d1, d2), −x∗AT = x∗BT = d, x∗A0 = x∗B0 = 0 with probability σ∗ and −x∗A0 = x∗B0 = d
with probability 1− σ∗.
iii) If d ∈ [d2, 1], x∗A0 = x∗B0 = 0, and −x∗AT = x∗BT = d2.
Under this AON scheme, the entrepreneur has to win at least half of the market to get funded. Then
the product-driven entrepreneur faces a tighter constraint of moving toward ideal design. Had she move
too close to the ideal design, she might lose the median consumer so that the entire funding. As a
consequence, she chooses the design d2 that makes the median consumer indifferent between profit-
driven and product-driven entrepreneurs in equilibrium so that she earns half of the market. Recall that,
under KIA scheme, she would choose design x∗T ≥ d2 that maximizes her expected utility by considering
the tradeoff of profit vs. product unconditionally. Therefore she chooses a design closer to the median
and earns a weakly higher market share and profit in the AON scheme than the KIA scheme.
In what follows, we compare consumer satisfaction under the two funding schemes.
Quality concern. The overall quality is the same with the KIA funding scheme in Section when
d ∈ [0, d1]. Now we consider the case where d ∈ [d2, 1]:
Q
s†
= (1− λ)2q∗T +
1
2
λ(1− λ)(1− cˆ)q∗T =
[
(1− λ)2 + 1
2
λ(1− λ)
]
T
T + γ
.
Finally, when d ∈ [d1, d2]:
Q
h†
= σQ
p
+ (1− σ)Qs†.
Apparently, Qs† ≥ Qs and Qh† ≥ Qh. On the one hand, under pooling equilibrium and d ≤ d1,
overall quality is still the highest and does not depend on whether the funding scheme is AON or KIA.
But on the other hand, if d > d1, adopting the AON scheme increases the overall quality of the platform.
Design popularity. The design popularity is the same with the KIA funding scheme in Section when
d ∈ [0, d2]. When d ∈ [d2, 1], the design quality is
U s†x = −λ2
∫ 1
0
c2dc− (1− λ)2
∫ 1
0
(c− d2)2dc− λ(1− λ)
[∫ 0
−1
c2 +
∫ 1
0
(c− d2)2
]
= −1
3
+ (1− λ)(d2 − d22) > U sx.
Thus, adopting AON decreases design popularity when d > d2, i.e, under separating equilibrium. Other-
wise, the design popularity is the same under the two funding schemes.
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Consumer welfare. The consumer welfare is the same with the case in Section when d ∈ [0, d2].
When d ∈ [d2, 1]:
W s† =− λ2
∫ 1
0
(
c2 + 1
)
dc− (1− λ)2
∫ 1
0
[
(c− d2)2 + (1− q∗T )2
]
dc
− λ(1− λ)
[∫ 0
−1
[
(c− 0)2 + 1] dc+ ∫ 1
0
[
(c− d2)2 + (1− q∗T )2
]
dc
]
− p.
Thus, under separating equilibrium, the impact of adopting AON on consumer welfare is more subtle. It
depends on whether its positive effect on quality dominates its negative impact on design diversification.
Otherwise, consumer welfare is the same under the two funding schemes.
Concluding Remarks
Competition among heterogeneously motivated entrepreneurs leaves footprints on consumers’ feedback
about the crowdfunding platform and thus has important implications for crowdfunding platform design
and policy makers. We make the first attempt to address how online crowdfunding facilitates competition
among heterogeneously motivated entrepreneurs. To this end, we formulate a spatial competition model
between profit-driven entrepreneurs and product-driven entrepreneurs. Our results indicate that, while,
on average, profit-driven entrepreneurs earn higher profits than product-driven ones, their advantage is
constrained by the mechanism of the crowdfunding campaign, and product-driven entrepreneurs earn
a significant fraction of the market. The richness of our model allows us to discuss implications on
consumer satisfaction and crowdfunding platform design.
In the meantime, our analysis leaves several questions open. What would happen if we allow for more
complicated pricing scheme similar to literature studies pricing strategies of crowdfunding platforms?
Can we use the framework to study entrepreneurs’ choices when facing different degrees of competition?
And can we endogenize entrepreneur’s occupational choice and discuss which kinds of individuals are
more likely to be an entrepreneur? We hope that someone, maybe ourselves, will pursue these research
agendas in the future.
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